HMMMM
There's a lot of homebuilts for sale with prices that are, I think, way out of line. One of the popular rich boy toys these days is the AirCam on amphibious float. I think these are way overpriced at $250,000, but now there's one advertised for $315,000. Similarly, RV-14s are a hot commodity, with a number for sale just under $200,000. Today I saw one advertised for $247,000, which is towards the high end of the RV-10 spectrum -and the RV-10 is a four seater. And this overpriced RV-14 has an overhauled, not new, engine, and not an IO-390.
Would I like to have another AirCam? Sure, even though this part of Georgia is not as scenic as where I lived in Iowa or Arizona. Amphibious floats? Uh, no... There's not much fresh water around here, and rivers tend to have logs and debris under the surface of the water, and wires over it. And I've heard that if you put a plane on floats, that doubles the insurance, and amphibious floats doubles it yet again.
How about an RV-14? A little faster and a little roomier than the RV-9A, both desirable, and handling not quite as good as the RV-9A but still plenty good. What I'd really like would be a baggage door, however, especially if I get another puppy dog. Or an RV-10 would work, too. But in these strange days, there's no place to go, nothing to do when you get there, and in my case, nobody to bring along. Sigh.
On the Expanded Envelope Exercises front, the webinar a few weeks back (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8k8PeC9n_8Y) had just under 50 attendees. Not bad, says I. As presenter, I couldn't check the attendee list, and forgot to ask somebody to check for me, but there were some folks there that I'm glad saw it. Maybe this will help get the aviation safety community working in a new direction.
After all, the FAA WINGS program is constrained to what's in the Airman Certification Standards (that define what you have to demonstrate to get your license), so the WINGS program in effect disallows any new approaches to aviation safety. To be a bit more blunt about it, the FAA's position seems to be that present safety techniques cannot be improved upon, if only those &(&%$ pilots would pay attention. Sort of like, "The beatings will continue till morale improves."
Here's something I'm thinking about, but probably still some holes in the thought processes. The big idea is that spins and low-speed spirals (LoSS) share a common root cause and are related symptoms of the same degraded cognitive availability. This idea was in the recent webinar mentioned above. The bottom line is that if we want to improve safety, we should treat the cause and not focus on the different symptoms of the same cause. Then again, Low Speed Spirals (LoSS) are not taught at all when accident data indicates that they are roughly as common as spins.
Suppose a pilot is making a turn in the traffic pattern, such as but not necessarily base to final. At some point, for some reason, the pilot decides that more turn is required, and focusing on that need for more turn and/or focusing on something else degrades the pilot's cognitive availability to pay attention to what the airplane is doing. Here are four bad ways that a cognitively unavailable pilot might try to get more turn:
If the pilot banks excessively and does not apply sufficient back pressure, this situation can degenerate into a LoSS (Low Speed Spiral). Overbanking tendency may contribute. Altitude loss is nominally 500 feet with a reasonably prompt recovery, but an overwhelmed pilot might consume more altitude. The FAA approved spiral recovery technique exacerbates altitude loss.
If the pilot banks excessively and adds forward stick, either due to being high or wanting to avoid a spin, this could be another variant of LoSS. This kind of LoSS might lead to an even more nose down attitude and more altitude loss. Altitude loss is nominally 600 feet when I demonstrate this, but I recover much more promptly than a flustered pilot might.
If the pilot tightens up the turn with excessive rudder and adds some back pressure to hold the nose up, this can be a skidding turn entry into a spin. This used to be called a spin out the bottom. Many consider this the major / only kind of loss of control to be concerned with, and this kind of spin is a major motivation for visual AOA -as if anybody would be looking inside the airplane when cognitive ability is already compromised by trying to get flight path alignment under control.
If the pilot banks a lot, tightens up the turn with back pressure, and then keeps the nose up with rudder, this can lead to a spin over the top. I used to demonstrate these to primary students right before they got their license.
This hypothesis treats the two cases of LoSS and the two cases of spin all as related symptoms of the same core problem. And if cognitive unavailability is indeed causal in low altitude LOC, it probably makes little difference what avoidance / recovery training a pilot may have received at altitude. Better to expand the pilot's personal flight envelope, expand the comfort zone, and thereby improve the pilot's cognitive availability to help the pilot recognize and avoid the situation in the first place.
This whole topic of shared causal factors of spins and LoSS would be a fascinating hypothesis for somebody to investigate further. Personally, I can't do a whole lot more inflight investigations because my plane is recommended against spins and my 2 g spine would probably not like the spin recoveries. Don't know who could pursue this work, but I'd be happy to consult-gratis, of course.
