Aviation Ancestry - March 2013
The SR-71, Part V
By Scott Schwartz
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curits LeMay. (Courtesy of USAF)
Selling the Blackbird to the Air Force would be a tough job, even for Clarence Kelly. The mere act of sitting in the Blackbird’s cockpit required uncommon self-confidence on the part of a pilot. Let’s face it; strapping into an aircraft which could fly faster than a .30 caliber bullet was a profound experience. Consequently, few Air Force officers relished the idea of commanding squadrons of these aircraft. Not to mention the secrecy and the costs involved with the Blackbird.
But, events taking place in the Soviet Union would soon cause a change in Air Force ideology.
In 1961, the CIA was able to intercept the results of a Soviet missile test, which had taken place in Siberia. Skunk Works analysts, after reviewing the data, came to a stunning conclusion: this was no missile test. Rather, the Soviets had been testing a bomber that could cruise at Mach 2, while flying at 60-thousand feet. There were no aircraft in the U.S. inventory that could intercept such a bomber, nor did we have any missiles that could shoot this aircraft down.
Of course, the Mach three Blackbird could be built as an interceptor – which was the point that Kelly Johnson wanted to get across to the Air Force. In order to make the idea more saleable to the Air Force, Johnson studied the idea of launching Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles from the Blackbird. He also proposed using the Blackbird to drop a two-thousand-pound non-explosive “bomb” – basically a hunk of metal – that would hit the ground with the force of a meteor. The Air Force was mildly interested in the latter idea, but using the Blackbird as a bomber was dismissed by then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Millions of dollars were already being poured into the North American B-70 program. The B-70 was intended to be a bomber that could hit Mach 2. It was also a project that was heavily favored by Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay. General LeMay was not necessarily one of the most diplomatic of personalities. When Kelly Johnson pointed out that the B-70 would be obsolete before the first piece of metal was cut, LeMay told him to focus on building spy-planes and to mind his own business.
In the meantime, Richard Bissell of the CIA had briefed then-President John F. Kennedy on the existence of the Blackbird spy-plane. President Kennedy then asked if the Blackbird could be converted into a bomber. Bissell explained that Lockheed wanted to do just that. Kennedy then asked why the B-70 was needed. Bissell referred the President to Gen. LeMay.
Although it was not directly a result of anything done by Lockheed – there were other reasons (still, Kelly Johnson was, embarrassed by Bissell’s breach of protocol) – the die was cast, and the B-70 would never see the light of day as an operational bomber.
For his part, Gen. LeMay blamed Johnson for the cuts that were made to the B-70 program (initially, it wasn’t cancelled entirely, but it was cut severely). He also didn’t think that the CIA was entitled to its own “air force.” However, the high-flying, fast Blackbird enabled the CIA to “see” hundreds of miles into Soviet territory without actually entering it.
Despite the political battles that were pitting LeMay and his B-70 against Johnson and his Blackbird, tensions with the Soviet Union were escalating. Things were so bad, that President Kennedy came away from one of his summit meetings with Khrushchev convinced (privately) that war was imminent.
Perhaps realizing that he should look at all of his options, General LeMay paid a visit to Kelly Johnson. During their meeting, LeMay grilled Johnson about the Blackbird’s potential usefulness as a bomber and as an interceptor. Johnson pointed out that, given the Blackbird’s speed and altitude capabilities, only a few would be needed to defend the whole North American continent.
By the end of the meeting, it was clear that LeMay was interested in a Blackbird interceptor, but not a Blackbird bomber. LeMay was still very enthusiastic about the B-70; in fact, he extracted a promise from Johnson that he would agree not to publicly speak out against the B-70. LeMay, in turn, stated that the Air Force would buy Blackbird interceptors, and that he’d get back to Johnson with the exact number of aircraft needed. Not one to quit while he was ahead, Johnson then asked LeMay if the Air Force could use any Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft. After expressing surprise that the Air Force hadn’t already ordered any, LeMay promised to send a contract to Johnson within several weeks.
To be continued…
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